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The intergovernmental financial relations between the
three countries of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
D r  E .J .P h . R o b e r t s *
This article is to be considered as a vignette in the broad subject of intergovernmental finan­
cial relations in composite states. It concerns the interaction between the governments in the 
three countries of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in the field of financial relations within the 
one constitutional framework.
It also highlights the importance of these financial links for the intergovernmental relations in 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands in general.
1. Introduction
The Kingdom of the Netherlands is a composite state, which consists of a European 
part and a Caribbean part.
The Caribbean part consists of two autonomous areas, Aruba, an island in front of 
the Venezuelan coast, and the Netherlands Antilles, consisting of 5 islands: Curacao, 
Bonaire, St. Martin, St. Eustace and Saba. The latter two islands are close neighbours 
of the British West Indies.
The two parts are very uneven in their characteristics. The population of the Nether­
lands amounts to almost 16 mill. and its GDP to $ 376,8 bill. The two 
Caribbean areas together have a population of 282.233 and a GDP of $ 4,4 bill. 1.
In the following the European part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands will be re­
ferred to as "the Netherlands", and the two Caribbean areas will be referred to as 
respectively "Aruba" and the "Netherlands Antilles". Each of the three entities is 
called “a country”.
* Dr. Roberts is a former Netherlands diplomat. He defended his doctoral thesis about the “Power of 
the Purse” in the Law Faculty of the University of Leiden in 1996. He is a comparatist of public law, 
is mainly interested in federal and pseudo-federal constructions and specialises in intergovernmental 
financial relations. He is a researcher working in the University of Nijmegen. E-mail adress: 
edw_roberts@yahoo.com. The author is grateful to Dr. F.H. van der Burg for his remarks on this text.
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The Kingdom of the Netherlands is a democratic monarchy. The relationship be­
tween the three countries is laid down in the Charter of the Kingdom of the Nether­
lands, which entered into force on 29 December 1954 2. Under the Charter the coun­
tries are autonomous in their internal affairs and equal in the conduct of common 
interests. The Charter has long been considered as embodying a phase towards com­
plete independence for the overseas countries3.
The Charter received recognition by the U.N 4
Each of the Countries has a constitution of its own. However, the Charter is the 
foremost constitutional document. (Art. 5,1).5 It refers to and is supplemented in cer­
tain institutional aspects by the Constitution of the Netherlands.
In the event of inconsistency the Charter prevails. (Art. 5.2)
The Charter may only be amended in agreement between the three parties. The rules 
for constitutional amendment have to be followed in the procedure of approval in the 
three countries6. (Art. 55)
The three countries are bound together by a common nationality; all citizens of the 
three countries have the Dutch nationality. (Art. 3 jo. Art. 60)
Although the main object of this article is to deal with financial relations, a meaning­
ful discussion of the subject has to be preceded by an outline of the constitutional 
relations between the three Countries under the Charter (= section 2). In section 3 the 
intergovernmental financial relationship in the Kingdom will be explored. In section 
4 some comparative notes will be made, comparing this intergovernmental financial 
relationship with the one in federal states.
2. Constitutional relations
In the preamble of the Charter a new constitutional order in the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands is announced. In this new order the three countries conduct their internal
interests autonomously and their common interests on a basis of equality.
To this definition is added a general commitment to accord each other assistance.
As regards its structure the Kingdom is sometimes classified as a pseudo-federal one. 
The division of powers between the Kingdom and the countries, as laid down in the 
Charter, gives rise to such classification.
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All “Kingdom Affairs” are listed in the Charter. Amongst these are the self-evident 
ones like foreign relations and defence, questions of nationality, extradition and ad­
mission, and the nationality of vessels. (Art. 3) Also amendments to the powers of 
parliament and to the power of the King are matters of the Kingdom (Art. 44), as 
well as the safeguarding of fundamental human rights and freedoms, the rule of law 
and the integrity of administration. (Art. 43)
Being part of the Kingdom does not prevent the overseas countries to be a member of 
a multilateral organisation in their own right. (Art. 28) The treaty by which such 
membership is realised, has to be signed or adhered to by the Kingdom Government.
Apart from the fixed list of “affairs of the Kingdom” the Charter presents a list of 
subjects for voluntary consultation and co-operation between the three countries.
(Art. 37)
The three countries may enter into mutual arrangements, which by mutual consent 
may be upgraded into a Kingdom Statute or a Kingdom Ordinance. (Art. 38)
The Charter also allows for the possibility of a Kingdom Ordinance by which the 
Kingdom Government makes the necessary provisions when the Governments of 
Aruba or of the Netherlands Antilles do not adequately perform their duties. (Art. 51) 
This article has never been implemented.
As regards the institutional set-up of the Kingdom, each country has its own council 
of Ministers, its own legislature and judicial organisation.
There is no separate central authority in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Instead, a 
two-cap-construction of the Netherlands Government has been introduced. The 
Netherlands cabinet fills the role of Kingdom Government and is supplemented by 
permanent representatives of the overseas countries (the so-called Ministers plenipo­
tentiary) when "affairs of the Kingdom" are on the agenda. The cabinet is only to 
meet in this composition when the matter under discussion also actually touches 
upon the interests of one or both of the overseas countries (Art. 10,1), or when the 
legislation under consideration is meant to be actually implemented in Aruba and/or 
the Netherlands Antilles. So, not only the formal definition of the matter is decisive
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to classify it as a Kingdom-issue; added thereto there has to be an actual interest of 
the matter for one of the overseas countries.
The Minister plenipotentiary may oppose a decision by the Kingdom cabinet that he 
thinks detrimental to his country. Deliberations on the subject will then continue in a 
reduced reconciliation committee of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom.
A Minister plenipotentiary may only be overruled when the exclusion of his country 
in the matter to be regulated, could be inconsistent with partnership in the Kingdom. 
(Art. 12,1) A straightforward veto-power is given to the overseas countries when 
they object to being bound by an international economic or financial agreement that, 
in their opinion, harms their interests. (Art. 25)
The Directorate General for Constitutional and Kingdom Affairs, acting under the 
responsibility of the Netherlands Minister for the Interior and Kingdom affairs, is 
conducting the administration of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The costs of the 
administration are to be divided amongst the three countries to the extent of the bene­
fit of the action to Aruba or to the Netherlands Antilles. The ratio used for the divi­
sion of the costs has to be approved by consensus between the three parties. (Art. 35) 
In fact all costs are budgeted in Chapter IV of the annual budget of the Netherlands 
Government. The budgetof this Authority -  i.e. apparatus costs plus the costs of fi­
nancial co-operation - remained at the average about 0.1 % of the Netherlands Gov­
ernments’ total annual budget during the period 1995 - 2002.
As regards the parliamentary legislative activity and control of the Kingdom, the 
Netherlands parliament is acting as the Kingdom-parliament (Art. 15).
Draft Kingdom Statutes are submitted to the parliaments of the countries in which 
their provisions are intended to apply. These parliaments have to report prior to the 
debate on the draft by the Second Chamber in the Netherlands, being the main legis­
lative forum of the Netherlands . The Ministers Plenipotentiary as well as delegates 
from the parliaments overseas have the right to attend that debate, to furnish informa­
tion and to propose amendments. They do not have the right to vote. Their action 
may lead to a postponement of the vote and renewed rounds of consultations. The 
absence of voting rights on behalf of the overseas legislatures seems indeed a serious 
defect in the Kingdom’s legislative procedure.
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The Ministers plenipotentiary of Aruba and of the Netherlands Antilles are empow­
ered to submit a draft for a Kingdom Statute to the Netherlands parliament on behalf 
of their governments.
The highest judicial power in the Kingdom is lodged in the High Court of the Nether­
lands, which is the court of cassation in the Kingdom in civil and penal law cases.
3. Financial relations
Federal states and federal like entities usually implement an equalisation-mechanism 
by which the least prosperous component states are assured of a reasonable part of 
total government income enabling them to exercise their autonomous powers. The 
mechanism functions under responsibility of the central federal authority by way of 
federal tax-legislation or by actual transfers from the central treasury, or a mixed 
system. The grants may often be divided into general purpose ones - i.e. no links 
attached - and conditional ones.
The situation in the Kingdom of the Netherlands is rather special and differs from the 
one in federal states in this aspect. The Kingdom itself does not have a common cur­
rency, or a treasury, or a budget. It does not even have legal personality under civil 
law. Each country in the Kingdom has its own currency, its own central bank and is 
responsible for its own monetary and budgetary policy, inclusive tax-legislation. 
However, this structure does not preclude a continuous flow of money out of the 
Netherlands treasury into Aruba and into the Netherlands Antilles7. Income per head 
of the population in the latter two countries is about one third less than that in the 
Netherlands.
The financial transfers from the Netherlands treasury to the Netherlands Antilles or 
Aruba are based on Article 36 of the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The 
Article reads in short: “The Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba accord 
each other aid and assistance.”
Article 36 provides for more than just a possibility. In the official explanatory memo­
randum to the Charter it is said that the partnership of the three countries in the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands has its consequences also when the countries are acting
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within the field of the autonomous powers, which are allotted to them under the 
Charter.
So, the Charter creates in Article 36 a bond, which is without specific engagement 
except where the interests of the partnership as such would be involved. In this way 
Article 36 respects the autonomy of the countries to the maximum, which was an 
important feature in order to convince the General Assembly of the United Nations 
of the acceptability of the Charter in 19558.
The co-operation provided for in Article 36 is an activity between autonomous coun­
tries. In each instance of co-operation the consensus between the Netherlands and 
Aruban or Netherlands Antilles’ authorities involved is required. Special consultative 
or executive bodies may be established for this co-operation. (Art.37)
To prepare for the ever-ongoing negotiations and consultations, and the travelling 
involved, special representatives of the Netherlands government are established in 
both overseas countries.
At least once a year a general high-level discussion on ministerial level takes place to 
evaluate the current projects and programs, and to discuss intended projects.
The financial transfers from the Netherlands treasury were used by both Caribbean 
countries in many fields of public investment and government care. This assistance 
being based on the Charter of the Kingdom is an intra-Kingdom affair. It differs as 
such from the Official Development Aid (ODA) granted by the Netherlands Gov­
ernment to foreign countries in the Third World in accordance with DAC9- criteria.. 
The Netherlands ODA quotum is 0,8 % GDP, or about $ 3,72 bill. Euro in its 2002 
budget. In the same budgetyear financial assistance to the Netherlands Antilles and 
Aruba amounted to a sum equivalent of 3,36 % of the Netherlands ODA. Calculated 
on a per capita basis in both countries as well as in absolute figures, this amount is 
higher than the bilateral financial assistance granted by the Netherlands to any single 
foreign country in the third World. According to DAC figures the Netherlands finan­
cial assistance equals 93 % of all financial aid flowing into both countries.
So the Netherlands is taking very seriously the rather undefined commitment of Arti­
cle 36 of the Charter. The more so where both Caribbean countries have been pro-
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moted in the DAC list of developing countries into the category of the most ad­
vanced under these countries.
Financial assistance has grown into the major activity in the daily governance of the 
Kingdom’s affairs. This fact is reflected in the annual budget of the Netherlands Di­
rectorate General being the central authority for Kingdom Affairs. In the period 1992
- 2002 the budget post for financial co-operation constituted about 95% of the total 
amount of the budget of that central authority.
The arrangements made under this financial co-operation between the Netherlands 
and both Caribbean countries have a less formal status than the bilateral agreements 
about development co-operation concluded between the Netherlands and Third 
World countries. Whilst the latter have status under international law, the former do 
not have any legal standing. They can seldom be considered more than politically 
binding despite the fact that they are sometimes titled Protocol or Covenant. Decisive 
for their political ranking is the approval by the Council of Ministers of the King­
dom. Principal decisions like multi-annual financial commitments or decisions about 
priority projects and programs belong to this category. However, most of the ar­
rangements are administrative arrangements between competent authorities made by 
exchange of letters and annexes.
Financial assistance by the Netherlands to the Caribbean countries took place in the 
majority of cases by way of co-financing projects. These transfers may be labelled 
specific grants. In the general practice of federal states specific grants enable the do- 
nor-authority to influence the way the grants are to be spent by attaching conditions 
to its assistance. The Netherlands authorities originally refrained from involving 
themselves too much in this way. Respect for the autonomy of the Caribbean part­
ners prompted the Netherlands authorities to keep their distance. Also the selection 
of the projects remained very much a matter for the authorities in both Caribbean 
countries.
It must be observed that the financial assistance given by the Netherlands did not 
lead to financial self-reliance of Aruba or of the Netherlands Antilles.
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The assistance has mainly been spent on public investment in infrastructure. A great 
part of public investment by the Caribbean authorities has in this way been paid out 
of the Netherlands budget under Article 36 of the Charter. Also other budget posts in 
the budgets of the overseas partners became gradually (partly) financed by Nether­
lands assistance, so that at last the main contribution of the two Caribbean countries 
to their own budget consisted in financing the personnel costs of their bureaucra­
cies10.
Financial dependency of both countries increased when the Netherlands Government 
started in the mid-80’s also to grant direct budget-assistance to them, thereby moving 
from its earlier position that such assistance would be contrary to the responsibility 
of the countries for their own financial policy. The argument given for this move was 
that the reduction of the budget deficit would raise the interest of private investors 
and thus improve the economic situation in the Caribbean countries.
The Netherlands decision in 1991 to grant the greater part of its assistance in capital 
expenditure à fond perdu was the third element that affected financial discipline. By 
that time the burden of interest payments had become too heavy for the Caribbean 
countries’ budgets. The earlier, outstanding loans, however, as well as those budget 
loans, which might be supposed to yield revenues, had still to be repaid.
About 1990 the Netherlands government set an other main priority for its financial 
co-operation: the promotion of ‘good governance’ in the Caribbean countries of the 
Kingdom. The introduction of this new priority was inspired by an important politi­
cal development. In this year the Netherlands Government expressed for the first 
time that it no longer aimed at independence for both Caribbean countries11.
This change of perspective also brought about a break in the practice of just summa­
rily examining the project-proposals drafted by the overseas authorities before grant­
ing them the financial assistance. A stepping up of actual co-operation had to accom­
pany the grants. Donor and recipient had to commit themselves to the details of the 
project.
The new policy gave rise to a substantial increase of technical assistance.
A certain tension between the concept of autonomy, as practised so far, and the in­
tensive co-operation aimed at under the new policy could be foreseen.
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From 1993 onwards the economic and financial situation in the overseas countries 
worsened quickly, especially in the Netherlands Antilles.
During 1996-1997 the financial situation in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba was 
the subject of a number of reports written on the request of the Netherlands Govern­
ment.
The reports also held policy-recommendations concerning financial assistance 12.
It also became clear that the financial situation of Aruba differed substantially from 
the one in the Netherlands Antilles.
As from 1986 Aruba has successfully concentrated on the tourist industry. The gov­
ernment of Aruba introduced a National Development Plan in 1991 by which also the 
Netherlands financial assistance got on firmer ground. Economic growth of Aruba in 
the period 1986 - 1995 rose to an average of 7,6% annually. Its per capita income 
was $17.700 in 1995 13and increased since then to $ 28.000. The country belongs to 
the most prosperous countries in the Caribbean.
As regards Aruba the prospect of financial self-reliance does exist. On 11 March 
1999 it has been agreed between the Netherlands and Aruba that over a period of 10 
years an amount of $218 mil. is to be made available by the Netherlands Govern­
ment to put Aruba’s finances on a healthy basis in accordance with IMF criteria. Out 
of this amount also the existing debts to the Netherlands government have to be 
paid14. So, in the year 2010 Aruba will, probably, be financially self-reliant.
As regards the Netherlands Antilles the abovementioned reports underlined that one 
of the main defects that undermined the effectiviness of the Netherlands financial 
assistance was the delay in drafting a comprehensive development plan by its gov­
ernment. The Wawoe-report underlined that the Netherlands Antilles will remain 
financially dependent if it does not organise itself so as to end the critical economic 
and financial situation 15.
The expertise of the IMF was invoked to repair this situation. As a result the Gov­
ernment of the Netherlands Antilles agreed on 10 May 1997 to a Structural Adapta­
tion Plan aimed at a financial reorganisation of the country. On that day it signed a 
Memorandum on Economic Policies drafted with the IMF that also monitors the im­
plementation of it.
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In January 1998 the Netherlands Government linked up with this development in a 
letter to the Netherlands Parliament setting out future policy16.
In the letter the Government expressed its opinion that stricter guarantees had to be 
created for an effective use of the financial assistance made available to the overseas 
countries. In accordance with the abovementioned Structural Adaptation Plan she put 
first priority on the reduction of the budget deficit of the Netherlands Antilles gov­
ernment. She made her financial assistance dependent on concrete progress in this 
respect.
Moreover, the Netherlands Government wanted the annual high-level consultations 
about the financial assistance in future to be held on the basis of elaborated pro­
grams. Financial assistance had to be switched from projects to programs, in first 
instance to programs in the social-economic field. By that time the amount for (co-) 
financing projects in this latter category totalled 36% of all financial assistance to 
both countries.
The money made available by the Netherlands authorities for each program agreed 
upon would have to be administered in a professional way free from political ma­
nipulation or patronage by a new development bank to be established in each of the 
overseas countries.
In the letter assistance for projects promoting “good governance” was expressly ex­
cluded from program assistance. In an earlier budget statement17 the Government of 
the Netherlands had declared that in her opinion the Kingdom as such has a respon­
sibility of its own in this field. In the January-letter she specified the subjects she was 
thinking of in this connection. It mentioned co-operation in the field of the 
administration and local government, security, maintenance of the order of law and 
duties in the field of matters concerning the Kingdom as a whole, like the coastal 
guard and criminal investigation. Co-operation concerning these subjects would have 
to remain organized by way of projects. Thus the duties and rights of the parties in 
each project may be defined in detail. The letter recommends that especially the 
commitments on projects of “good governance” are approved on cabinet level.
The letter also includes a time path. Program assistance in the social-economic field 
had to be fully introduced in the year 2000, had to be evaluated in the year 2002 and 
might be extended into other fields from the year 2003.
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The policy announced in the January letter did not prevent that the budget deficit in 
the Netherlands Antilles, which had been targeted on 2% GDP in the Special Adapta­
tion Plan, increased to 7,4% GDP in 1998. The Netherlands Antilles government 
asked for a delay of 2 years for the 2% GDP target. Part of the Netherlands financial 
assistance was suspended until revised arrangements would have been made between 
the IMF and the government of the Netherlands Antilles. The Netherlands govern­
ment officially declared the Netherlands Antilles’ government to be in arrears as re­
gards the repayments on loans due in 1996 and 199718.
A new Netherlands Government presented to the Parliament an elaborated version of 
its policy concerning its intra-Kingdom financial co-operation in a comprehensive 
document of 14 June 1999, titled “ A Future in Co-operation”19.
The principal purpose of the policy defined therein is the promotion of financial self­
reliance of the two Caribbean countries.
In the document the Netherlands Government admits that the financial co-operation 
under the Charter had resulted in certain dominance by the Netherlands authorities in 
decisions concerning investment in the Netherlands Antilles and on Aruba. This had 
diminished the effectiveness of the co-operation.
The Netherlands Government confirmed its intention to follow a program-approach 
for co-financing the development of the two countries instead of its former support of 
specific projects. It wanted to entrust the funds, which she would transfer, to inde­
pendently operating development banks.
Moreover, it established 4 priorities on which the co-operation will be concentrated: 
good governance, sustainable economic development, education, the maintenance of 
the order of law and human rights.
The two overseas governments would decide on the projects to be initiated under the 
program and be responsible for their implementation. The Antillean and Aruba au­
thorities had to submit their requests for co-financing to the independent develop­
ment bank, which would make the money available under the conditions defined in 
the regulations for the bank. The regulations had to be drafted in agreement between 
the Netherlands and the overseas authorities. It was assumed that political tampering 
with the allocation of the money could thus be prevented as much as possible.
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The fourth priority would be excepted from the program approach. Co-operation in 
that field would only be continued by way of projects. This sector of co-operation 
represents at the moment about 12% of the value of ongoing projects.
The introduction of the revised format of financial co-operation and the provision of 
new financial means would be dependent on two conditions i.e. sound financial pol­
icy based on international standards and on sound governance. The Netherlands An­
tilles’ government had to create in both aspects a new situation, which offered suffi­
cient guarantee for an effective financial co-operation.
The conditions of the co-operation being thus defined by the Netherlands Govern­
ment, the judgement about the progress made towards those international standards 
is left to the IMF.
As mentioned above the Netherlands Antilles’ Government did not meet the dead­
lines set in its arrangement with the IMF under the Special Adaptation Plan. In Sep­
tember 2000 an agreement was concluded between the Netherlands Antilles gov­
ernment and the IMF about a set of measures to reduce the budget deficit. The 
measures were initially carried out by the Antillean government, which gave the 
Netherlands government occasion to support the Antillean budget with a certain 
amount. However, the measures recommended by the IMF did not lead to the in­
tended reduction of the country’s budget deficit because of a loss of tax revenue and 
an increase in expenditure. On the suggestion of the IMF the Netherlands Govern­
ment granted extra budget support to compensate for the loss of tax revenue caused 
by the New York disaster of 11 September 2001. The IMF suggested a set of prior 
actions necessary to cut expenditure. The Antillean government, however, did not 
give any follow up to the IMF suggestions. So, the Antillean budget deficit ran up to 
4,2% GDP in 2001.
The budget presented for 2002 showed a deficit of only 1,6% GDP. This seemed to 
correspond with the IMFrecommandations. However, doubts about the estimates of 
the amounts of revenues and expenditures prevailed. Subsequently the IMF demon­
strated that the budget fell short of the target by $ 40 mil.20
In the meantime the Netherlands government follows a double track in its financial 
co-operation with the Antillean government. She gives additional budget support
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when recommended by the IMF. Next to that she gives "regular aid" which is a con­
tinuation of her project aid that is now regrouped into programs. Also in the cluster 
of projects concerning sustainable economic development she lets herself be guided 
by IMF and World Bank advice.
The development bank that is to finance the projects proposed by the Antillean gov­
ernment, has not been established as yet. So, also "regular aid" still means direct 
support of the Antillean budget.
In Aruba the development bank is functioning since January 2002 and programs 
have been established. However, discussions about financial co-operation between 
Netherlands and Aruba authorities are somewhat hindered by the debate which has 
arisen over the question of the actual contents of the relationship with the Nether­
lands when Aruba will indeed achieve its financial self-reliance, as planned, in 2009. 
In this connection the Netherlands Minister responsible for Kingdom Affairs stated 
in the Netherlands parliament in April 2002 that financial solidarity is and will re­
main an essential element of partnership in the Kingdom. Referring mainly to the 
Netherlands Antilles he added that a continuation of the existing constitutional rela­
tionship necessitates an internationally credible economic and monetary policy of 
each country. “A fundamental change under the Kingdom's Charter will be neces­
sary, when it becomes evident that this could not be achieved. For no country is to 
govern itself and have the costs thereof be borne by another one “21.
This statement was supported by an important part of the members of the Nether­
lands parliament.
4. Comparative notes
In the above it is indicated how the intergovernmental financial relationship in the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands has an impact on the autonomous status of the overseas 
composite parts of the Kingdom. In order to underline the characteristics of this in­
tergovernmental relationship a few comparative notes will follow comparing this 
relationship with the practice in federal states.
A. In federal states the federal government usually regulates the institutions of 
intergovernmental financial relations and the sharing of total government 
revenues.
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In the Kingdom of the Netherlands such central federal authority is lacking. The 
Charter only provides for a general obligation of mutual assistance between the 
countries of the Kingdom. Implementation of this article requires in every phase of 
preparation of the assistance the consensus between partners. In fact the mutual assis­
tance consists only of a sharing of Netherlands government revenue with Aruba and 
the Netherlands Antilles.
The obligation to mutual assistance does not preclude the Netherlands from attaching 
conditions to its assistance in respect of matters that pertain to the autonomous pow­
ers of both Caribbean countries
B. In federal states the aim of the redistribution of tax revenue and the trans­
fers from the federal treasury is to achieve a. degree of equalisation of the fi­
nancial capacity of all component states.
In the Kingdom of the Netherlands the achievement of financial self-reliance by the 
Caribbean countries is the main policy-aim of the financial assistance granted. Pro­
gress along this road is measured by the IMF in accordance with IMF norms. More­
over, as regards the achievement of a sufficient degree of sustainable economic de­
velopment, the judgement of the American Development Bank is of importance.
So, it is not the degree of prosperity in the Netherlands itself that is setting the crite­
rion for the volume of assistance needed to equalise more or less prosperity in the 
three countries of the Kingdom. The criterion is set by the standards developed by 
foreign bodies, i.e. international organisations, and based on their experiences and 
observations in the same region.
C. In federal constitutional constructions the concept of equalisation of finan­
cial capacity is carried by the idea of the integration of the component states 
into the federal structure.
In the intergovernmental financial relations between the partners in the Kingdom the 
motive of integration is lacking. The strictly autonomous powers attributed by the 
Charter to the countries in the monetary, financial and economic policy fields are
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indicative in this question. Actually, the Netherlands, being one of the equal partners 
in the Kingdom, is more integrated in these fields with the Member-States of the 
European Union than with its Kingdom-partners. This situation also seems to prevent 
the Kingdom to develop into a “real” federation. For this would imply an extension 
of the territorial scope of the Treaty on the European Union over non-European terri­
tory. It is very doubtful that all EU Member States would agree to such extension.
D. In federal states the amounts to be redistributed among the states are estab­
lished by an act of the federal legislature, which includes the approval of (a 
house representing) the states.
The volume of financial assistance by the Netherlands to Aruba and to the Nether­
lands Antilles is determined by the Netherlands Parliament when giving its approval 
to the annual budget of the Netherlands Government. The Netherlands Government 
is then free to spend the money for the purpose as she sees fit. The approval is given 
by way of a Netherlands Act.
E. In a federal state the ratio between the totals of respectively the specific 
grants and the general-purpose grants might be taken as an indication of the 
measure of autonomy that a component state is allowed to exercise. The 
amount of general-purpose grants tends generally to be the larger of the two 
categories of grants.
The financial co-operation in the Kingdom of the Netherlands consists for far its 
greater part of specific grants. This seems in contrast with the frequent statements 
Netherlands government about her recognition of the autonomy of the two overseas 
countries. The announced swing from project-aid to program-support reduces this 
contrast only marginally.
F. Concluding remarks
• Both Caribbean countries are at the moment financially more dependent on the 
Netherlands than in colonial times22.
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• The institutions of intergovernmental financial relations in the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands show no parallelism with those in federal states.
• The intergovernmental financial relationship in the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
has grown into a major determinant in the constitutional set-up of the Kingdom.
Malden, November 2002
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1 2001 figures. Source: CIA World fact book
2 Published in Staatsblad [Statute book] 1954, no. 596.
3 In 1975 Surinam, a former overseas country part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, has indeed 
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tries in one constitutional bond but also sets them very clearly apart at the same time.
9 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and De­
velopment (OECD)
10 Edo Haan p. 222.
11 Budget statement 1990-1991 Second Chamber nr. 21800 Chapter IV nr.2, p. 8
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Commission Modalities of Financing.
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